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AMERICA'S NEW WAR ON TERROR: THE
CASE FOR SELF-DEFENSE UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
JACK M. BEARD*
I. INTRODUCrION
When representatives of fifty countries assembled in San
Francisco in 1945 to draw up the United Nations Charter,
modem threats of terrorism such as those posed by the Al
Qaeda terrorist network were not yet known. The devastation
caused by the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United
States would not, however, have been an unfamiliar spectacle
to the survivors of World War II. The "inherent" right of self-
defense in responding to such violent attacks, a right enshrined
in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and understood by the
delegates of all states as a long-established principle of
customary international law, was a familiar concept in 1945.1
It was in accordance with these long-established principles of
customary international law and Article 51 that the United
States Government reported in a letter to the U.N. Security
Council on October 7, 2001, that it had "initiated actions in the
* Associate Deputy General Counsel (International Affairs), U.S. Department of
Defense; Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center;
Professorial Lecturer in International Relations-International Law and
Institutions, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns
Hopkins University. The views presented are those of the author and do not
reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the United
States Government.
1. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter provides:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any
way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under
the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary
in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
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exercise of its inherent right of individual and collective self-
defence following the armed attacks that were carried out
against the United States on 11 September 2001. '2 The letter
went on to note that since the September 11 attacks, the U.S.
Government had obtained "clear and compelling information
that the al-Qaeda organization, which is supported by the
Taliban regime in Afghanistan, had a central role in these
attacks" and that United States armed forces had initiated
actions "designed to prevent and deter further attacks on the
United States" including "measures against al-Qaeda terrorist
training camps and military installations of the Taliban regime
in Afghanistan."
The letter of October 7, 2001 was not the first time the United
States has notified the U.N. Security Council of actions
involving the use of force against other states and has invoked
its inherent right of self-defense in response to terrorist attacks.
As discussed below, previous uses of force by the United States
against terrorist-supporting states have received varying
responses from the international community, given rise to
some criticism, and raised a number of international legal
questions involving the right of guaranteed self-defense under
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. In contrast, the unprecedented
response of the international community to the September 11
terrorist attacks on the United States and important factual and
legal distinctions between the circumstances surrounding the
September 11 attacks and previous attacks giving rise to the use
of force by the United States, demonstrate the propriety of the
exercise of self-defense in this case under the U.N. Charter and
customary international law.
2. Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America, to
the United Nations, Addressed to the President of the Security Council (Oct. 7,
2001), U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/2001/946 (2001).
3. Id. The letter also noted that the United States was "the victim of massive and
brutal attacks in the states of New York, Pennsylvania and Virginia," that were
"specifically designed to maximize the loss of life; they resulted in the death of
more than 5,000 persons, including nationals of 81 countries, as well as the
destruction of four civilian aircraft, the World Trade Center towers and a section
of the Pentagon." The U.S. Government further stated, "Our inquiry is in its early
stages. We may find that our self-defence requires further actions with respect to
other organizations and other States." Id.
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II. PREVIOUS USES OF FORCE AGAINST TERRORIST-SUPPORTING
STATES BY THE UNITED STATES
On April 14, 1986, in response to a bombing of a West
German discotheque in which an American serviceman and a
Turkish woman were killed and more than 230 other persons
injured, the United States launched air strikes against five
terrorist-related targets in Libya. Based on intercepted and
decoded exchanges between Tripoli and the Libyan embassy in
East Berlin, the United States claimed that this attack was one
of a continuing series of Libyan state-ordered terrorist attacks
The U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Vernon Walters,
informed the U.N. Security Council that the United States had
acted in self-defense, consistent with Article 51, and that the air
strikes were necessary to end Libya's "continued policy of
terrorist threats and the use of force, in violation of... Article
2(4) of the Charter."
On June 26, 1993, the United States launched a cruise missile
attack on Iraq in response to a foiled assassination attempt
against former President Bush. Twenty-three Tomahawk
missiles were launched at the Iraqi Intelligence Service in
Baghdad, causing a number of civilian deaths and destroying
much of the complex. On June 27,1993, U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations Madeleine Albright reported to the U.N.
Security Council in this regard: "We responded directly, as we
were entitled to do under Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter, which provides for the exercise of self-defence in such
cases."
6
4. Bob Woodward & Patrick E. Tyler, Libyan Cables Intercepted and Decoded,
WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 1986, at Al. Libya disclaimed responsibility for the
discotheque bombing. Eleven years later the United States permitted decoded
interception transcripts to be made public in the Berlin Chamber Court where
persons employed by or affiliated with the Libyan embassy in East Berlin were
indicted for the bombing. See Bill Gertz, U.S. Intercepts from Libya Play Role in Berlin
Bomb Trial, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 19,1997, at A13. The decoded transcripts indicated
that Libyan authorities had ordered the raid and that Libyan operatives in Berlin
had confirmed the successful attack. On November 13, 2001, four people,
including one Libyan diplomat and a Libyan Embassy worker, were convicted of
the bombing, after prosecutors had argued that Libya was guilty of "state-
sponsored terrorism." Steven Erlanger, 4 Guilty in 1986 Disco Bombing Linked to
Libya, in West Berlin, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14,2001, at AS.
5. U.N. SCOR, 41st Sess., 2674th mtg. at 18, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2674 (1986). See
Letter from the Acting Permanent Representative of the United States of America,
to the United Nations, Addressed to the President of the Security Council (Apr.
14,1986), U.N. SCOR, 41st Sess., U.N. Doc. S/17990.
6. U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3245th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3245 (1993).
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In response to the suicide bombings of the U.S. embassies in
Tanzania and Kenya, which killed more than two hundred
people, including twelve U.S. citizens, and were allegedly
perpetrated by the Al Qaeda terrorist network, on August 20,
1998, the United States launched seventy-nine Tomahawk
missiles at terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and against
a Sudanese pharmaceutical plant that the United States
identified as a "chemical weapons facility" associated with
Osama bin Laden.7 The Government of the United States
informed the U.N. Security Council that it had repeatedly
warned the Government of Sudan and the Taliban regime to
shut terrorist organizations down in their respective countries
and to "cease their cooperation with the Bin Laden
organization."' Because the Al Qaeda organization had
continued to issue "blatant warnings that 'strikes will continue
from everywhere' against American targets" and because
further attacks appeared to be in preparation, the United States
stated that it "had no choice but to use armed force to prevent
these attacks from continuing. In doing so, the United States
ha[d] acted pursuant to the right of self-defence confirmed by
Article 51.. .. "9
III. INTERNATIONAL REACTION TO PREVIOUS USES OF
FORCE BY THE UNITED STATES AGAINST
TERRORIST-SUPPORTING STATES
Previous military actions by the United States against
terrorist-supporting states elicited varying responses from the
international community and the United Nations. In the case of
the 1986 raid on Libya, the United States action was not widely
supported. A resolution condemning the U.S. action was
introduced in the U.N. Security Council but was vetoed by the
Ambassador Albright went on to note that the U.S. response had been
"proportionate and aimed at a target directly linked to the operation against
President Bush. It was designed to damage the terrorist infrastructure of the Iraqi
regime, reduce its ability to promote terrorism and deter further acts of aggression
against the United States." Id.
7. See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 161,161 (1999).
8. Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America, to
the United Nations, Addressed to the President of the Security Council (Aug. 20,
1998), U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/1998/780.
9. Id.
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United States, France, and the United Kingdom." The U.N.
General Assembly adopted a resolution condemning the
United States for the attack by a vote of seventy-nine to twenty-
eight, with thirty-three abstentions."
In contrast, most states either supported or did not object to
the 1993 cruise missile attack on Baghdad in response to the
foiled Iraqi assassination attempt on former President Bush,
although most of the Arab world expressed regret regarding
the attack. 2 In response to the American presentation before
the U.N. Security Council, the representatives of other member
states either expressed support for the U.S. action or refrained
from criticizing it; only China questioned the attack. 3 The
General Assembly took no action.
World reaction to the 1998 U.S. cruise missile strikes against
terrorist targets in Afghanistan and Sudan in response to the
U.S. embassy bombings in East Africa was mixed, with the
10. U.N. SCOR, 41st Sess., 2682d mtg. at 43, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2682 (1986).
Australia and Denmark also voted against the resolution, while Venezuela
abstained. Id.
11. G.A. Res. 41/38, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 34, U.N. Doc.
A/41/53 (1986). While international criticism was considerable at the time, one
commentator noted that the international reaction changed over the course of
several years: "In this incident, as in others, an elongation of the time horizon
yields a different picture of international responses. After the immediate reaction
to the raid and the regional and national condemnations, Western European
nations began to adopt economic and diplomatic sanctions against Libya." W.
Michael Reisman, International Legal Responses to Terrorism, 22 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 3,
34 (1999).
12. See Stephen Robinson, UN Support for Raid on Baghdad, DAILY TELEGRAPH*
(LONDON), June 28, 1993, at 1 ("Countries in the United Nations Security Council
including Britain and France queued up last night to support America's missile
attack on Iraqi intelience headquarters in Baghdad. There was a widespread
feeling at the council s emergency meeting in New York that yesterday's pre-
dawn raid ... was justified following evidence that Iraq had been deeply involved
in an attempt to assassinate former President Bush."); Craig R. Whitney, European
Allies Are Giving Strong Backing to U.S. Raid, N.Y. TIMES, June 28,1993, at A7 ("With
rare unanimity, the European allies reacted with approval today to the United
States missile strike against Iraq.... Russia said the action was justifiable self-
defense in accordance with the United Nations Charter .... ."); Arab Governments
Critical, N.Y. TIMEs, June 28, 1993, at A7 ("The Arab League ... expressed its
'extreme regret' at the attack.").
13. See Robinson, supra note 12, at 1. Although most Arab and Muslim states
did not support the U.S. action, the three Islamic countries on the Security
Council-Djibouti, Morocco, and Pakistan-remained silent during the Council's
discussions and expressed no support for Iraq. See id. See also Stanley Meisler,
U.N. Reaction Mild as U.S. Explains Raid, L.A. TIMES, June 28, 1993, at Al (noting the
somewhat lukewarm but still supportive reactions of most U.N. ambassadors to
the attacks on Iraq); Julia Preston, Security Council Reaction Largely Favorable to U.S.
Raid, WASH. POST, June 28,1993, at A12 (citing the largely favorable response from
the U.N. Security Council).
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most intense criticism focused on the Sudan attack. Western
European nations supported the U.S. actions to varying
degrees, while the Russian President Boris Yeltsin declared that
he was "outraged" by the "indecent" behavior of the United
States. a China issued an ambiguous statement condemning
terrorism, and Japan said it "understood America's resolute
attitude towards terrorism."' 5 In spite of public opinion
generally hostile to the United States in the Arab and Muslim
world, "most Arab and Muslim Governments remained silent
or equivocal about their views on the missile strikes." 16 The
U.N. Security Council discussed the matter only briefly,
ultimately deferring requests to send an international team of
inspectors to the bombed facility in Khartoum to search for
evidence of chemical weapons after the United States rebuffed
Sudan's requests to produce such evidence.'7 Neither the
Security Council nor General Assembly took any formal action
in response to the U.S. action against Sudan and Afghanistan.
Previous uses of force by the United States against terrorist-
supporting states have thus enjoyed varying levels of support
among states and have raised a number of international legal
questions. In particular, as noted above, the U.S. raid against
Libya in 1986 was not well received. While a significant part of
the reaction of the United Nations to America's raid on Libya
can be explained by Cold War politics, serious legal questions
were also raised. A perceived lack of evidence tying the West
Berlin discotheque bombing and other terrorist activities to
Libya, questions regarding the propriety under Article 51 of an
armed response against a state for the actions of terrorists, the
suggestion of retaliatory motives, related arguments against the
necessity and proportionality of U.S. actions, and the absence
of an "armed attack" owing in part to an isolated murder of
American servicemen abroad, all contributed to criticism by
states and scholars of the raid on Libya as an illegitimate act of
14. Phil Reeves, Outraged Yeltsin Denounces "Indecent" US Behavior,
INDEPENDENT (LONDON), Aug. 22,1998, at 2.
15. Id.
16. Douglas Jehl, U.S. Raids Provoke Fury in Muslim World, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22,
1998, at A6.
17. See Barbara Crossette, Judith Miller, Steven Lee Myers & Tim Weiner, U.S.
Says Iraq Aided Production Of Chemical Weapons in Sudan, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1998,
at Al ("The United States... rebuffed calls from the Sudan and other countries to
turn over its evidence.").
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self-defense. 8 The unprecedented response of the U.N. Security
Council and the international community in general to the
September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States provides a
stark contrast to the reaction to the raid on Libya. Assessing a
number of factual and legal distinctions between the
circumstances surrounding the September 11 attacks and
previous terrorist attacks giving rise to the use of force by the
United States helps to demonstrate the propriety of the most
recent exercise of self-defense under Article 51 and customary
international law.
IV. RESPONSE OF THE U.N SECURITY COUNCIL
At the outset, the willingness of states and the U.N. Security
Council to invoke and affirm the right of self-defense in
response to the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United
States contrasts sharply with previous terrorist attacks. Before
the September 11 terrorist attacks, the U.N. Security Council
had never approved a resolution explicitly invoking and
reaffirming the inherent right of individual and collective self-
defense in response to a particular terrorist attack. It is
significant, then, that while the U.N. Security Council stated
that it "[u]nequivocally condemn[ed] in the strongest terms the
horrifying terrorist attacks which took place on 11 September,"
it also explicitly and unanimously "[r]ecogniz[ed] the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with
the Charter."19 Sixteen days later, the U.N. Security Council
again unanimously condemned the terrorist attacks on the
United States, explicitly "[rleaffirming the right of individual or
collective self-defence as recognized by the Charter of the
United Nations as reiterated in resolution 1368 (2001) .
18. Among other things, U.N. Security Council delegates criticized the U.S. raid
on Libya for neither being in response to an "armed attack" nor being based on
substantiated Libyan involvement in "terrorist" activities. See William V. O'Brien,
Reprisals, Deterrence and Self-Defense in Counterterror Operations, 30 VA. J. INT'L L.
421, 464-65 (1990). Some commentators, while questioning Libyan involvement,
strongly criticized the raid as a reprisal. See Francis A. Boyle, Military Responses to
Terrorism, 81 PROc. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 288, 294 (1987) ("The April 14 devastation
wreaked upon Tripoli and Benghazi by the Reagan Administration was a classic
case of what international law professors call actions of military retaliation and
reprisal.").
19. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1368 (2001).
20. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1373 (2001).
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 25
The Council's unprecedented willingness to invoke and
reaffirm self-defense under Article 51 in response to the
September 11 terrorist attacks is an important act and, for some
states, helped legitimize the U.S. military response as a legal
use of force.2'
V. OVERVIEW OF SELF-DEFENSE UNDER ARTICLE 51
Assessing the legality of the use of force begins with review
of two obligations under the U.N. Charter. First, Article 2(3)
requires all members to settle their international disputes by
peaceful means. 2 Second, and more importantly, Article 2(4)
provides that "[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations." 23 According to the International Court of Justice
("I.C.J."), this obligation to refrain from the threat or use of
force is not just a U.N. Charter provision but is now also
regarded as a rule of customary international law.24 Thus, the
use of force against any state may be undertaken only as an
21. See Charles Bremner, Europeans Support 'Legitimate' US Action, TIMES
(LONDON), Sept. 22, 2001, at 2 ("At an emergency EU summit Tony Blair and the
other 14 leaders pledged 'total solidarity' with Washington in the fight against
terrorism .... An American military riposte was legitimate, the leaders said,
noting that the U.N. Security Council had backed the principle of American self-
defence."). Similarly, Sweden's Premier noted that "the USA has a right to defend
itself against terrorism .... The Social Democrats stand behind the UN's work
and the Security Council has unanimously supported the US' right to self-
defense." Dagens Nyheter, Swedish Premier Reiterates Support for US Military
Response, BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Sept. 25, 2001.
22. The United Nations Charter, Article 2(3) provides: "All Members shall settle
their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international
peace and security, and justice, are not endangered." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3.
In this regard, after September 11 and before military action against Afghanistan
commenced on October 7, the United States made repeated efforts to seek the
Taliban regime's cooperation in delivering Osama bin Laden. These efforts at
peaceful resolution of the conflict were categorically rejected by the Taliban
regime. See John F. Burns, Clerics Answer 'No, No, No!' and Invoke Fates of Past Foes,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2001, at B3 ("Within hours of President Bush's speech to
Congress on Thursday night demanding that the militant Muslim clerics who rule
Afghanistan hand over Osama bin Laden, their envoy gave today what was
described as their final answer: 'No, no, no!'"). After the air campaign had
commenced, President Bush offered the Taliban a "second chance" to turn over
Osama bin Laden, but that offer was also rejected. See Paul Richter, Errant Bomb
Hits Housing Row in Kabul, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2001, at Al.
23. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
24. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 100 (June
27).
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exception to a norm of customary international law.
While Article 51 of the U.N. Charter provides such an
exception for self-defense and recognizes this "inherent" and
long-established right under customary international law, the
requirements for self-defense under Article 51, particularly the
"armed attack" requirement, have been much debated. Because
Article 51 explicitly provides for self-defense "if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,"25 the
I.C.J., along with numerous publicists and scholars, has taken a
narrow or stringent view of self-defense under Article 51 and
customary international law, concluding that "[s]tates do not
have a right of 'collective' armed response to acts which do not
constitute an 'armed attack'."2 Another focus, however, is on a
broader "inherent" right of self-defense that existed under
customary international law before the U.N. Charter and
presumably continues to the present dayY While numerous
scholars and commentators vigorously argue that customary
international law and the inherent right of self-defense contain
no "armed attack" requirement z8 the September 11 terrorist
attacks justify the exercise of self-defense by the United States
under even a narrow or stringent reading of Article 51.
25. U.N. CHARTER art 51.
26. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. at 110.
27. D.W. Bowett noted in this regard:
It is, therefore, fallacious to assume that members have only those rights
which the Charter accords to them; on the contrary they have those rights
which general international law accords to them except and in so far as
they have surrendered them under the Charter.... As we have seen, the
view of Committee I at San Francisco was that this prohibition left the
right of self-defence unimpaired; in the words of the rapporteur 'the use
of arms in legitimate self-defence remains admitted and unimpaired.'...
The history of Art 51 suggests nothing of an additional obligation; the
travaux pr~paratoires, to which we may legitimately resort in the case of
ambiguity, suggest only that the article should safeguard the right of self-
defence, not restrict it.
D.W. BOWErr, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 185, 188 (1958). See also
Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620,1634
(1984) ("It is therefore not implausible to interpret article 51 as leaving unimpaired
the right of self-defense as it existed prior to the Charter.").
28. Former State Department Legal Advisor Abraham Sofaer wrote: "Self-
defense allows a proportionate response to every use of force, not just 'armed
attacks."' Abraham D. Sofaer, U.S. Acted Legally in Foreign Raids, NEWSDAY (NEW
YORK), Oct. 19, 1998, at A29. In his assessment of customary international law
before the U.N. Charter era, Bowett stated, "[I]t is quite certain that under the
general law the right was not limited to cases of an armed attack." BOWETr, supra
note 27, at 188.
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VI. INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE U.S. MILITARY
RESPONSE UNDER ARTICLE 51
A. Decisive Support by Allies and Other States Throughout
the World in Response to the "Armed Attack"
That the September 11 terrorist attacks can be described as an
"armed attack" is implicit in the U.N. Security Council's
invocation and reaffirmation of the right of self-defense under
Article 51 in Resolutions 136829 and 1373,3" noted above.
Furthermore, the clear and decisive reaction of so many states
to the September 11 attacks is significant on this point. In an
unprecedented move, the nineteen member countries of the
North Atlantic Council of NATO issued a statement on
September 12, 2001, agreeing that if it was determined that the
September 11 terrorist attacks were directed from abroad
against the United States, "it shall be regarded as an action
covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states
that an armed attack against one or more of the Allies in
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against
them all." 31 On the basis of subsequent briefings by the United
States, NATO determined that the September 11 terrorist attack
was indeed directed from abroad and the NATO Secretary
General concluded that the attack was an action covered by
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.32
In another unprecedented action, this time at a special
Washington D.C. meeting of the Organization of American
States ("OAS") foreign ministers on September 22, 2001, the
twenty-two states of the Western Hemisphere party to the
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance ("Rio Treaty") 33
unanimously passed a resolution declaring:
These terrorist attacks against the United States of America
are attacks against all American states, and... in accordance
with all the relevant provisions of the [Rio Treaty] and the
29. See S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 19.
30. See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 20.
31. Press Release, NATO, Statement by the North Atlantic Council (Sept. 12,
2001), available at http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2001//pOl-124e.htm.
32 Press Release, NATO, Invocation of Article 5 Confirmed (Oct. 2, 2001),
available at http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2001/1001/elOO2a.htm.
33. Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, T.I.A.S. No.
1838 [hereinafter Rio Treaty].
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principle of continental solidarity, all States Parties to the Rio
Treaty shall provide effective reciprocal assistance to
address such attacks and the threat of any similar attacks...
34
Article 3 of the Rio Treaty, which underlies the September 21
resolution, specifically refers to an "armed attack by any State
against an American State."35
The unambiguous NATO statements and the OAS delegates'
reaffirmation of the Rio Treaty clearly suggest that NATO
member states and the states party to the Rio Treaty regarded
the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States as
"armed attacks," fully justifying the exercise of the inherent
right of self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. The
European Union ("EU"), along with its member states
individually, pledged to support U.S. action against terrorism.6
Similar views and various offers of support were made by
America's Pacific allies, including Australia, New Zealand,
Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea. 7 In addition to the
Pacific allies, EU, NATO, and OAS members, numerous states
throughout Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia expressed their
34. Twenty-fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs,
Terrorist Threat to the Americas, OAS Doc. RC.24/Res.1/01 (Sept. 21, 2001),
available at http://www.oas.org/OASpage/crisis/RC.24e.htm.
35. Rio Treaty, supra note 33, art. 3, §1. Article 3, §1 of the Rio Treaty provides:
The High Contracting parties agree that an armed attack by any State
against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the
American States and, consequently, each one of the said Contracting
Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Id.
36. See America Strikes Back: Allies, DENVER POST, Oct. 9,2001, at A8.
37. See Actions Taken Around the World as Coalition Begins Air Strikes in Afghanistan,
ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, Oct. 14,2001, WL APWIRES File. While Australia
invoked the ANZUS Treaty and put military personnel and aircraft on standby to
join in any U.S. military action, New Zealand, not currently a participating
member in the treaty, nonetheless offered an unspecified number of commandos
to assist in America's self-defense efforts, with New Zealand's Foreign Minister
stating "We don't need a treaty to tell us what is right and what is wrong." Id.
Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi expressed a desire to send non-combat support
for anticipated U.S. military responses to the terrorist attacks. Id. Philippines
President Arroyo pledged "'unequivocal' support for the U.S.-led international
campaign against terrorism in response to the September 11 attacks ... 
Philippines Updates Disaster Contingency Plan, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Oct. 5,
2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Deutsche Presse-Agentur File. The Philippines also
"opened up its airspace and other facilities for use by U.S. forces in the war
against terrorism, and expressed willingness to deploy combat troops with the
approval of Congress." Id.
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support for the U.S. military response to the September 11
terrorist attacks.38
B. Muslim and Arab States'Reactions
While public opinion in the Arab and Muslim world
opposed the U.S. action against Afghanistan, several Arab
states such as Bahrain, Egypt, and Jordan expressed support for
the U.S. anti-terror campaign.39 Other Arab states also made
significant contributions to U.S. military efforts, including
Pakistan by agreeing to support various U.S. military
operations in Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia by allowing various
operations from Prince Sultan Air Base, and Persian Gulf states
such as Oman and Kuwait by allowing use of air bases on their
territories. 40 Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates also
quickly cut their diplomatic ties with the Taliban, leaving
Pakistan as the only state recognizing the Taliban regime,41 and
38. See Actions Taken Around the World as Coalition Begins Air Strikes in Afghanistan,
supra note 37. Other European countries voicing support for U.S. air strikes
included Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia,
and Slovakia; African states expressing varying degrees of support for the U.S.
response included Botswana, Cameroon, Congo, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Sao
Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Zambia; Asian states
included Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Georgia, India,
Israel, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Singapore, Taiwan, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan. See id.; America Strikes Back, supra note 36; Terrorism: World
Governments'Reactions, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Sept. 18, 2001, at A12; Kazakh Leader
Offers Full Support for U.S. Strike, REUTERS, Sept. 24, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Reuters News File; Samuel Loring Morison, The Coalition Against Terrorism, NAVY
NEWS WEEK, Oct. 22, 2001; Kyrgyzstan Voices Full Support for U.S. Strikes in
Afghanistan, XINHUA GEN. NEWS SERV., Oct. 16, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Xinhua
Gen. News Serv. File; Forces Available to US-led Coalition as Afghan Strikes Contiue,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 11, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Agence France
Presse File.
39. See AFP World News Summary, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 26, 2001, LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Agence France Presse File (citing Bahrain's Crown Prince pledging
"unreserved support for US-led war on terrorism"); Relaunching the Propaganda
War, ECONOMIST, Nov. 10, 2001, at 15-16 (quoting Egypt's foreign minister,
Ahmad Maher, as saying, "There is war between bin Laden and the whole
world").
40. See Mark Mazzetti, Richard J. Newman, Thomas Omestad & Linda
Robinson, Taking Aim From Up Close, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 29, 2001, at
18-20; America Strikes Back, supra note 36. Oman and Bahrain also made
particularly strong statements of support accompanying their offers of assistance.
See Terrorism: World Governments' Reactions, supra note 38 (citing Oman's leader,
Sultan Qaboos, and his pledge to stand "side by side" with the United States to
fight terrorism); Alice Thompson, Emir Praises the 'Good Fight' to Liberate
Afghanistan, DAILY TELEGRAPH (LONDON), Nov. 13, 2001 (quoting the Emir of
Bahrain as saying that the U.S. and British actions in Afghanistan are "[liberating
it from this evil Taliban" and are "a very good war of liberation.").
41. See America Strikes Back, supra note 36. Pakistan completely severed
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several Arab states such as Yemen closed their borders to
would-be volunteers seeking to leave and join their Afghan
mujahedeen in a holy war against the United States.Y An
emergency meeting of the Organization of the Islamic
Conference (OIC), an organization composed of representatives
of fifty-six Muslim countries, was nearly unanimous in
condemning the September 11 attacks.43 The OIC ignored the
Taliban's call for a fihad against the United States and, rather
than demanding an end to the U.S. strikes against Afghanistan,
instead "pushed for assurances that the American-led
campaign against terrorism would not spill over to other
Muslim countries."'
C. Unprecedented Offers of Airspace and Territory
and Unusual Statements of Support
While statements of support for America's right of self-
defense were numerous and impressive, the unprecedented
types of assistance that states were willing to offer the United
States provide another important and powerful representation
of state practice affirming the right of self-defense in this case.
Aware of the political and international legal significance of a
state making its territory and airspace available for U.S. and
coalition military operations against Afghanistan,45 states
nonetheless made numerous offers of such assistance to the
United States. Seven days after the U.S. had commenced its air
diplomatic relations with the Taliban when, on November 22, 2001, the Pakistani
government ordered the regime to close its Islamabad embassy, the only
remaining Taliban embassy. See Maura Reynolds, Response to Terror on the
Battlefield, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23,2001, at Al.
42. See Yaroslav Trofimov, Nations Supporting Jihads of Yesteryear Now Close
Borders, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2001, at Al.
43. See Soft Words, Uneasy Thoughts, ECONOMIST, Oct. 13, 2001, at 23.
44. Id. OIC Secretary General Abdulwahid Belkeziz also said in a statement that
he supports, among other U.N. Security Council actions, Resolution 1368
(affirming the right of self-defense in response to the September 11 terrorist
attacks), although he failed to mention Resolution 1373. Pan-Islamic Body Condemns
Terrorism But Says Nothing on U.N. Resolution, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 1, 2001,
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Agence France Presse File.
45. States have often noted the serious responsibilities associated with
permitting their territories and airspace to be used by the military forces of other
states, as reflected in the U.N. General Assembly's "Definition of Aggression"
Resolution, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142-43, U.N.
Doc. A/9631 (1974) (referring to Article 3(f), which specifically provides that "the
action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of
another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression
against a third State" itself qualifies as an "act of aggression".
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campaign against Afghanistan, the Washington Post reported
that thirty-six countries had offered the United States troops or
equipment, forty-four countries had allowed U.S. use of their
airspace, thirty-three countries were offering landing rights,
and thirteen countries had permitted storage of equipment.46
The willingness of states to make their territories and
airspace available for use by U.S. forces in military actions
against Afghanistan stands in sharp contrast to previous U.S.
actions against terrorists. In 1986, when the United States
sought permission for its military aircraft to overfly territories
in order to attack Libya in response to the West Berlin
discotheque bombing, France refused to allow American F-111s
from bases in the United Kingdom to overfly French territory.47
When, in 1998, the United States responded to embassy
bombings in Tanzania and Kenya by directing cruise missiles at
Afghani terrorist training camps, Pakistan refused to sanction
U.S. use of its airspace, instead filing a diplomatic protest with
the U.N. Security Council after the raid.48
Even states that often opposed U.S. military action, including
Russia and China, displayed support after September 11. While
China has condemned or questioned most previous uses of
force by the United States and even abstained in the U.N.
Security Council vote authorizing the use of force against Iraq
in 1990,49 China joined in immediately to condemn the
September 11 terrorist attacks, vote for the Security Council
resolutions affirming the right of self-defense, and offer a
"wary endorsement of military strikes on Afghanistan."50
While Iran, a vocal opponent of U.S. military intervention,
46. Inside Afghanistan, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 2001, at A20.
47. See James Adams, How Europe Got Tough on Terrorism, WASH. POST, Feb. 14,
1988, at Cl.
48. See Letter from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan, to the United
Nations, Addressed to the President of the Security Council (Aug. 24, 1998), U.N.
SCOR, 53d Sess., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/1998/794. Pakistan also vigorously denied
prior knowledge of the cruise missile attack. See Betsy Pisik, Pakistan Files
Complaint Over Attack; Angry Letter to U.N. Tells of Unexploded Missile, WASH. TIMES,
Aug. 25, 1998, at Al.
49. See U.N. SCOR 678, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg. at 27, U.N. Doc S/RES/678
(1990).
50. Philip P. Pan, For Bush and Jiang, Question of Risk and Reward, WASH. POST,
Oct. 18, 2001, at A26. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao stated,
"We are in favor of the fight against terror, but the strikes should be aimed at clear
targets and refrain from injuring innocent civilians." Robin Wright & Edwin
Chen, China, Russia Urge Quick End to Strikes, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2001, at A3.
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criticized America's use of force against Afghanistan, the
Iranian Government was reported to have taken the unusual
step of agreeing to help rescue any downed U.S. military
personnel in its territory.5' Even the Vatican's senior
spokesman said that Pope John Paul II understood that the
United States might need to use force against terrorists in self-
defense.52 Finally, of special note, Libyan leader Moammer
Gaddafi condemned the September 11 terrorist attacks as
"horrific" and endorsed U.S. retaliation, an action described by
some commentators as "a notable development by. a onetime
militant anti-American targeted in 1986 by U.S. bombs."5 3
VII. FACrS AND LAW: DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN THE SEPTEMBER
11 ATTACKS AND PREVIOUS TERRORIST ATrACKS
The actions of the U.N. Security Council and the decisive,
widespread, and unprecedented actions and statements by
states supporting the U.S. right of self-defense against the
September 11 terrorist attacks are compelling evidence of the
international community's assessment of the applicability of
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter to America's new war on terror.
These state actions also highlight various factual and legal
distinctions between the September 11 terrorist attacks and
previous terrorist attacks that resulted in more widely
criticized uses of force by the United States against terrorist-
supporting states.
A. Location of the Attack
Opponents of the United States's previous resorts to force in
the face of terrorist acts argued that states may only respond to
51. See Hugh Pope & Peter Waldman, Winds of Change: Iran's Islamic Leaders
Face Sudden Unrest Since Terror Attacks, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 2001, at Al; see also
Elaine Sciolino & Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Gets Closer to Iran, Wins Pledge to Aid GIs in
Distress, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 16, 2001, at 4 (describing ,an's offer to rescue distressed
American military personnel in its territory as "an important sign of growing
cooperation with the United States in its war against Afghanistan").
52. Sharon LaFraniere, Vatican Says Use of Force by U.S. Can be Justified, WASH.
Posr, Sept. 25, 2001, at A14. The Vatican spokesman stated: "It is certain that, if
someone has done great harm to society, and there is a danger that if he remains
free he may be able to do it again, you have the right to apply'self-defense for the
society which you lead. .. ." Id.
53. Peter Slevin & Alan Sipress, Tests Ahead for Cooperation on Terrorism, Several
Countries on Blacklist Have Helped U.S., but Only Marginally So Far, WASH. POST,
Dec. 31, 2001, at A10.
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terrorist attacks within their own territory and that attacks on
nationals overseas cannot meet the "armed attack" requirement
of Article 51.sa This was of particular concern to critics of the
1986 air strikes on Libya and is much debated among
scholars,'5  yet it is clearly not at issue with regard to the
September 11 attacks, a fact that has added to the willingness of
the international community to condemn the horrific actions on
the territory of the United States as "armed attacks."
B. Magnitude of the Attack and Sustained and
Continuing Terrorist Campaign
Another objection to the 1986 action against Libya was that
isolated or "sporadic or minor attacks do not warrant such a
serious and conspicuous response as the use of force in self-
defence."5 6 Such a criticism does not appear to be applicable
with regard to the September 11 attacks. While relatively
isolated or limited injuries caused by an attack on a few citizens
54. See Francis A. Frowein, The Present State of Research Carried Out by the
English-Speaking Section of the Center for Studies and Research, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF
TERRORISM 55, 64 (1988) ("[T]here cannot be any question that an armed attack
cannot consist of a terrorist action against citizens on foreign territory, even if
tolerated by the territorial state."); see also James P. Rowles, Military Responses to
Terrorism: Substantive and Procedural Constraints in International Law, 81 PROC. AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. 307, 314 (1987) ("Isolated terrorist attacks . . . do not constitute
armed attacks justifying the use of force in the exercise of the right of self-defense,
even assuming state sponsorship . . . . Large-scale, continuing campaigns of
terrorist attacks could, depending on the facts ... give rise to the right of self-
defense, but even then only within the limits of necessity and proportionality ...
.1).
55. See Abraham D. Sofaer, The Sixth Annual Waldemar A. Sotf Lecture in
International Law: Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REV. 89,
96 (1989) ("No nation should be limited to using force to protect its citizens, from
attacks based on their citizenship, to situations in which they are within its
boundaries."). The Al Qaeda attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania
in 1998 clearly challenged the view that attacks must be on the territory of the
United States to qualify for self-defense under Article 51. See Ruth Wedgwood,
Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against bin Laden, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 559, 564
(1999) ("The massively destructive bombings of the embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania, with a horrific loss of life, were clearly 'armed attacks' that allowed
forcible measures of self-defense, even under the most stringent reading of U.N.
Charter requirements."). See also Richard B. Lillich, Forcible Self-Help Under
International Law, in 62 U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES:
READINGS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW 1947-
1977, at 129, 134 (Richard B. Lillich & John Norton Moore eds., 1980) (citing
numerous instances in which the United States has sought to protect its nationals
overseas with force and stating that there is no doubt that states may use force to
protect their nationals as a matter of self-defense under international law).
56. Antonio Cassese, The International Community's "Legal" Response to Terrorism,
38 INT'L & COmp. L.Q. 589, 596 (1989).
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may not serve as a basis for an armed response against
terrorists under Article 51, in response to September 11, even
the U.N. General Assembly has taken the unusual step of
meeting in a special session to condemn the "heinous acts of
terrorism, which have caused enormous loss of human life,
destruction and damage in the cities of New York [and]
Washington, D.C., and in Pennsylvania."57 The fact that the
September 11 terrorist attacks occurred on the territory of the
United States, that Al Qaeda's ongoing terrorist attacks against
American targets represent a sustained and continuing injury
to the United States, and that the attacks caused an enormous
loss of life and severe damage to both private and government
property, bring these terrorist attacks into a category that
would implicate a state's right to self-defense, even under a less
permissive standard than that reflected in contemporary
international practice.-
C. Evidentiary Support
Another criticism of previous American uses of force against
states supporting terrorists is the perceived lack of evidence
tying the terrorists to a particular organization and tying that
organization to a particular state. Some critics have argued that
the U.S. Government has shown "consistent disregard of
evidentiary showings" in such previous uses of force and that
it has effectively taken the position that the factual premises of
these actions were unreviewable 5 9 Evidentiary concerns about
the identity of the bombers of the West Berlin discotheque and
their ties to Libya were aggravated by the inability of the
Reagan Administration to fully disclose the compelling records
of intercepted communications between Tripoli and the Libyan
57. GA Res. 56/1, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., at 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/1 (2001).
See also Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 14,103-04
(June 27) (regarding the requirement set forth by the I.C.J. that armed bands must
occur on a "significant scale before they can constitute an "armed attack'). The
related criticism that Article 51 cannot apply to sporadic incidents that are not
part of a recurring series of attacks is addressed below.
58. See Robert J. Beck & Anthony Clark Arend, "Don't Tread on Us":
International Law and Forcible State Responses to Terrorism, 12 WIS. INT'L L.J. 153,
216-18 (1994). Based on a survey of legal scholarship and state practice, the
authors propose the three factors applied here for establishing the "armed attack"
threshold: locus, temporal duration, and severity of injury to a state. Id.
59. Jules Lobel, The Use of Force to Respond to Terrorist Attacks: The Bombing of
Sudan and Afghanistan, 24 YALEJ. INT'LL. 537,548,553 (1999).
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Embassy in East Berlin regarding that bombing and
contributed to criticism of the raid.6 ° To a lesser extent,
evidentiary concerns were also raised regarding the alleged
plot to kill former President Bush that resulted in the 1993
cruise missile attack on the Iraqi Intelligence Service Complex
in Baghdad. 6' Finally, doubts about the undisclosed "sensitive"
evidence supporting the U.S. attack on the alleged chemical
weapons complex in Sudan in 1998 continue to persist and
contributed significantly to criticism of U.S. actions in response
to the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya.6 R
In contrast to some previous uses of force against terrorists,
the U.S. Government made presentations of relevant sensitive
and classified information about the attacks of September 11 to
a number of foreign governments and subjected this evidence
60. See discussion supra note 4. Some states on the U.N. Security Council had
alleged that Libyan involvement in terrorist activities was not substantiated. See
O'Brien, supra note 18. Some commentators, skeptical of the classified information
that the U.S. Government could not disclose, were highly critical of the U.S. case.
See Boyle, supra note 18, at 293 ("The only evidence the American people have to
go on is the Reagan Administration's claim that intercepted cable traffic between
Tripoli and the People's Bureau in East Berlin somehow established Libyan
responsibility for the April 5 bombing. We are expected to accept its obviously
self-interested word for.., the existence this evidence.").
61. See Seymour Hersh, A Case Not Closed, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 1, 1993, at
80. Commentators criticized the failure of the U.S. Government to disclose
relevant facts and its statements unilaterally characterizing those facts. See Lobel,
supra note 59, at 547; Louis Henkin, Notes from the President, ASIL NEWSL. (The
American Society of International Law, Washington, D.C.), June 1993, at 2. In
addition to criticizing the "unilateral" U.S. action on the basis of its own findings
and its own characterization of the facts, Mr. Henkin strongly criticized the legal
basis of the U.S. attack on Iraq, questioning the use of such "flabby questions of
self defense" in both this case and in earlier U.S. actions, including the 1986 air
strikes against Libya. In spite of this scholarly criticism, many representatives to
the U.N. Security Council found that the United States had presented a strong
evidentiary case. See Alan D. Surchin, Note, Terror and the Law: The Unilateral Use
of Force and the June 1993 Bombing of Baghdad, DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 457, 467
n.63, 468 (1995) (noting that the Japanese Ambassador found the evidence
"compelling;" Brazil sided with the United States because of the "clear evidentiary
link," and New Zealand cited the "professionalism" and credibility of U.S. law
enforcement agencies involved in the investigation).
62. Sean Murphy notes that:
Although the United States had claimed the plant was linked to Osama
bin Laden and (based, in part, on a soil sample taken outside the plant)
was involved in the production of chemical weapons for his terrorist
purposes, there was very little publicly available evidence connecting the
plant to chemical weapons production.
Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International
Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 348, 368 (2000). Mr. Murphy further notes that the United
States was still not prepared to release "sensitive information" even to defend
itself in a civil suit in 1999. Id.
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to considerable scrutiny. The result was decisive. Following a
briefing of the North Atlantic Council by the United States and
speaking on behalf of the 19 members of NATO, the Secretary
General of NATO, Lord Robertson, said: "The facts are clear
and compelling. The information presented points conclusively
to an Al-Qaida role in the 11 September attacks."" The British
Government even took the unusual step of establishing a
website with continuously updated information on Al Qaeda's
and Osama bin Laden's responsibility for the September 11
terrorist attacks. 64
Any denials of responsibility by Osama bin Laden have also
been undermined by his own remarks. His statements alone
have been persuasive evidence of his guilt to some government
leaders. While noting that "the evidence presented by the
United States proves [Osama bin Laden's] guilt of the terrorist
attacks on New York and Washington," the Prime Minister of
Finland, Paavo Lipponen, also noted that "'the statements by
al-Qa'ida and the Taliban perhaps present their own, clear
proof of guilt.'"' Although Osama bin Laden initially denied
responsibility for the September 11 attacks while at the same
time praising the attackers, his later comments were
increasingly self-incriminating. After reviewing transcripts
from videos which were made but not broadcast by Osama bin
Laden, Prime Minister Tony Blair told the British Parliament
that "'the intelligence material now leaves no doubt
63. Statement by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson (Oct. 2, 2001),
available at http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/sO11O02a.htm. A NATO
press release further noted the following: "As a result of the information he [U.S.
Ambassador at Large Frank Taylor] provided to the Council, it has been clearly
determined that the individuals who carried out these attacks were part of the
world-wide terrorist network of al Qaeda, headed by Osama bin Laden and
protected by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan." Press Release, NATO, supra note
32.
64. Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States, 11 September
2001, 10 DOWNING STREEt NEWSROOM, Oct. 4, 2001, at http://www.number-10.
gov.uk/news.asp?Newsd=2686. The U.K. Government would later use this
website to publicize new findings that focus on links between the majority of the
hijackers and the Al Qaeda network.
65. Finnish Premier Convinced by US Evidence of Bin-Ladin Link with Attacks, BBC
WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Oct. 14, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis File, BBC Worldwide
Monitoring File. Other countries such as Russia that have traditionally been less
than convinced by U.S. presentations of evidence supporting U.S. military
intervention were uncharacteristically supportive. "Mr. Putin, for his part, needed
no convincing of bin Laden's guilt. He had said that he recognized Mr. bin
Laden's 'signature.'" The Economist Intelligence Unit, Ltd., EIU VIE sWIRE, Oct
8, 2001.
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whatsoever of the guilt of bin Laden and his associates.... Far
from hiding their guilt, they gloat about it., '
66
Even clearer is the evidentiary link between the Al Qaeda
organization and the Taliban Regime, a link explicitly
recognized by the U.N. Security Council in its imposition of
economic sanctions on the Taliban Regime.67 Statements by the
British Government that Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda and the
Taliban have a "close and mutually dependent alliance"6 were
further demonstrated to be true by discoveries of Al Qaeda
facilities and infrastructure throughout Afghanistan after the
Taliban's retreat from these areas.69
VIII.ATrRIBUTING STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR TERRORIST
ACTIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
While a link between the Taliban Regime and the Al Qaeda
terrorists who launched the September 11 attacks is well
established, the issue of attributing state responsibility for these
terrorist actions raises a number of international legal
questions. This is particularly true in finding that the Taliban
Regime's support, protection, or sponsorship of terrorists
constitutes an "armed attack" under Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter or that it violates Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter
prohibiting a state from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of another state.
While Article 2(4) explicitly prohibits only "members" of the
66. Andrew Miga, War on Terrorism; On The Run -U.S. Rescues Aid Workers as
Taliban Turns Tail, BOSTON HERALD, Nov. 15, 2001, at 1. Osama bin Laden was
quoted as saying in the tape: "If avenging the killing of our people is terrorism,
let history be a witness that we are terrorists .... The battle has been moved
inside America, and we shall continue this battle, or die in the cause and meet our
maker.'" Id.
67. See S.C. Res. 1333, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4251st mtg. 8, U.N. Doc. S/Res/
1333 (2000).
68. Britain's Bill of Particulars: "Planned and Carried Out the Atrocities", N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 5, 1991, at B4. The statement further notes: "Osama bin Laden and Al
Qaida provide the Taliban regime with material, financial and military support.
They jointly exploit the drugs trade. The Taliban allows Bin Laden to operate his
terrorist training camps and activities from Afghanistan, protects him from
attacks from outside, and protects the drug stockpiles. Osama bin Laden could not
operate his terrorist activities without the alliance and support of the Taliban
regime. The Taliban's strength would be seriously weakened without Osama bin
Laden's military and financial support." Id.
69. "The apparent Qaeda presence in a Taliban defense ministry building
suggested that Osama bin Laden's organization and the radical Islamic
government were closely linked." David Rhode, In 2 Abandoned Kabul Houses. Some
Hints ofAl Qaeda Presence, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17,2001, at Al.
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United Nations from engaging in forcible actions against the
territorial integrity or independence of any state and makes no
reference in this regard to individuals, groups, or
organizations, it is also fairly well established that a state that
directly supports and sends out armed bands or groups to
carry out serious acts of armed force against another state is
itself responsible for an act of aggression.70 It is not difficult to
maintain the integrity of the U.N. Charter by applying these
concepts to states that are closely affiliated with terrorist
organizations, directly support their activities, and assist them
in orchestrating devastating attacks against other states.'
International practice now increasingly confirms state
responsibility for such terrorist actions against other states.
While the extent of affiliation, tolerance, or support of
terrorist organizations can be a source of debate in holding
states accountable for terrorist acts, the international
community appears to be increasingly willing to apply
international legal prohibitions, including Article 2(4) of the
U.N. Charter, to states that sponsor or support terrorists, and
even to apply these prohibitions to states that merely acquiesce
in their organized activities on their territory. The attitude of
states in this area has been evolving towards stricter standards
of state responsibility and imposition of clearer obligations. In
1970, General Assembly Resolution 2625 affirmed that:
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing,
instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or
70. The General Assembly's Definition of Aggression Resolution provides, in
Article 3(g), that "Any of the following acts... qualify as an act of aggression: ...
the "sending by or on behalf of a state of armed bands, groups, irregulars or
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another state of such
gravity as to amount to acts listed above or its substantial involvement therein."
G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 45, at 142. The I.C.J. has found that "[t]his description,
contained in Article 3, paragraph (G) ...may be taken to reflect customary
international law." Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ.
14, 109 Uune 27). In the case of rebels in Nicaragua (the contras) who were
financed and equipped by the United States, the I.CJ. discussed this part of the
Aggression Resolution but found that in spite of high levels of U.S. assistance and
support, "there is no clear evidence of the United States having actually exercised
such a degree of control in all fields to justify treating the contras as acting on its
behalf." Id.
71. An argument can also be made that regardless of state support, Article 2(4)
and Article 51 are not obstacles to responding to massive terrorist attacks. See
Wedgwood, supra note 55, at 564 ("There is nothing in the U.N. Charter or state
practice that restricts the identity of aggressors against whom states may
respond-for private actors as well as governments may be the sources of
aggressive conduct.").
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terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized
activities within its territory directed towards the
commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the
present paragraph involve a threat or use of force.72
On December 9, 1985, the U.N. General Assembly
unanimously approved Resolution 40/61, which not only
unequivocally condemned all acts of terrorism as criminal, but
also called upon states "to fulfill their obligations under
international law to refrain from organizing, instigating,
assisting, or participating in terrorist acts against other states,
or acquiescing in activities within their territory directed
towards the commission of such acts."7' In March of 1992, the
U.N. Security Council explicitly linked a state's involvement
with terrorism to its obligations under Article 2, Paragraph 4.
In Resolution 748, the Security Council imposed economic
sanctions on Libya for its continuing involvement with terrorist
activities and for its refusal to extradite two Libyan nationals
alleged to have been involved in the 1988 bombing of Pan Am
Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. The Council affirmed that:
In accordance with Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter of
the United Nations, every State has a duty to refrain from
organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist
acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities
within its territory directed toward the commission of such
acts, when such acts involve a threat or use of force.74
In this significant assessment of state responsibility for terrorist
activities, the Council clearly considered the Article 2(4)
prohibition to extend to all forms of state involvement,
participation, and acquiescence in terrorism. In 1994, the
General Assembly passed the Declaration on Measures to
Eliminate International Terrorism, reaffirming similar state
responsibilities in this area.7' On August 13, 1998, in addition to
72. G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 122, U.N. Doc.
A/8018 (1970). While General Assembly resolutions are not law and are non-
binding, they are important expressions of the attitudes of states and may, when
evidencing widespread or nearly unanimous agreement, serve as the basis for the
eventual development of related customary international law.
73. G.A. Res. 40/61, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 302, U.N. Doc.
A/40/53 (1985).
74. S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3063d mtg. at 52, U.N. Doc. S/RES/748
(1992).
75. See G.A. Res. 49/60, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 304, U.N. Doc.
A49/743 (1994) (-States, guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of
the United Nations and other relevant rules of international law, must refrain
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condemning the "indiscriminate and outrageous acts of
terrorism" against the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and
Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, the U.N. Security Council again
stressed that "every Member State has the duty to refrain from
organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist
acts in another state or acquiescing in organized activities
within its territory directed toward the commission of such
acts."76
Finally, acting in the wake of the September 11 terrorist
attacks, the U.N. Security Council even more clearly
established state responsibility for terrorist acts and decisively
imposed related obligations on the members of the United
Nations under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. After further
condemning the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United
States, reaffirming the inherent right of self-defense, and
reaffirming that such acts of terrorism constitute a threat to
international peace and security, 'U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1373 requires all states to undertake a wide range of
measures to prevent, suppress, and criminalize the financing,
planning, preparation, and execution of terrorist acts.7' The
Council further decided that all states shall, inter alia:
Refrain from providing any support, active or passive, to
entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, including by
suppressing recruitment of members of terrorist groups and
eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists;... Deny
safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit
terrorist acts, or provide safe havens;... Prevent those who
finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from using
their respective territories for those purposes against other
States or their citizens.78
While a state may have once argued that the actions of
from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in
territories of other states, or from acquiescing in or encouraging activities within
their territories directed toward the commission of such acts."); see also
Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate
International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 51/210, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 49, at
348, U.N. Doc. A/51/631 (1996) (stating that the General Assembly "reiterates its
call upon states to refrain from financing, encouraging, providing training for or
otherwise supporting terrorist activities").
76. S.C. Res. 1189, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., 3915th mtg. at 110, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1189 (2001).
77. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 20. Unlike G.A. resolutions or any other actions by
U.N. bodies, decisions of the U.N. Security Council are binding on all members of
United Nations. See U.N. CHARTER art 25.
78. Id. 1 2(a),(c)-(d).
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terrorist organizations did not impose responsibility on that
state under Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter and did not subject
them to forcible measures in response under Article 51, those
conditions no longer appear to pertain, at least in
circumstances where an attack as devastating as the September
11 attacks are launched on the territory of another state and
where the link between the terrorists and the sponsoring state
is so well established and recognized by the international
community.
IX. CONDEMNATION OF THE TALIBAN REGIME'S SUPPORT FOR
TERRORISM AND ITS LINK WITH AL QAEDA
In regard to the link between Al Qaeda and the Taliban
Regime, the U.N. Security Council has on numerous occasions
made the Taliban's clear and established support of terrorist
networks a subject of concern and condemnation. On
December 8, 1998, the U.N. Security Council, in noting that it
was "deeply disturbed by the continuing use of Afghan
territory, especially areas controlled by the Taliban, for
sheltering and training terrorists and the planning of terrorist
acts," went on to demand that "the Taliban stop providing
sanctuary and training for international terrorists and their
organizations." 79
Following the indictment by a U.S. court of Osama bin Laden
and his associates for the East Africa U.S. embassy bombings
and the Taliban's refusal to turn over Osama bin Laden for
trial, the U.N. Security Council again unanimously condemned
the continuing use of Afghan territory controlled by the
Taliban for sheltering and training terrorists and for planning
terrorist acts.80  Determining that the Taliban's actions
constituted a threat to international peace and security, the
Council acted under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and
passed Resolution 1267, which, among other things,
"demanded that the Taliban turn over Usama bin Laden
79. S.C. Res. 1214, U.S. SCOR, 52d Sess., 3952d mtg. at 82-83, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1214 (1998).
80. S.C. Res. 1267, 52d Sess., 4051st mtg. $$ 1-2, U.N. Doc. SEC/RES/1267
(1999). The Council stated that it deplored "the fact that the Taliban continues to
provide safe haven to Usama bin Laden and to allow him and others associated
with him to operate a network of terrorist training camps from Taliban-controlled
territory and to use Afghanistan as a base from which to sponsor international
terrorist operations." Id.
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without further delay to appropriate authorities in a country
where he has been indicted.... "81 After the Taliban rejected all
its demands, the Security Council passed Resolution 1333 in
which it again condemned the Taliban Regime for its support
of international terrorism, deplored its continuing provision of
safehaven to Osama bin Laden and his associates, and
demanded that the Taliban swiftly close all terrorist training
camps on its territory.82 Citing the Taliban's actions as a threat
to international peace and security, the Council imposed a wide
variety of economic and diplomatic sanctions on the Taliban,
including the freezing of financial assets of Osama bin Laden
and the Al Qaeda organization.83
The record in the U.N. Security Council thus supports the
finding that no government has been as universally
condemned by the international community for its support of
terrorism and so closely linked with terrorist activities as the
Taliban Regime of Afghanistan. With this status comes a more
easily assigned and more certain international legal
responsibility for the horrific attacks on the United States of
September 11 and a dearer case for self-defense under Article
51.
X. NECESSITY AND PROPORTIONALITY
A final legal issue that has given rise to substantial debate
among scholars regarding previous uses of force against
terrorism is the requirement of necessity and proportionality. It
is a well established rule of customary international law that
even when a state is lawfully engaged in the exercise of its
inherent right of self-defense, its use of force must be limited to
that force necessary to defend against the attack and must be
proportionate.84 Striking back against an enemy without a
81. Id.
82. S.C. Res. 1333, supra note 67, 1-3. The Council also specifically noted the
indictment in the United States of Osama bin Laden and his associates for the
August 7,1998, bombings of US. embassies in East Africa. Id.
83. Id. 5, 8; Further measures were imposed by the U.N. Security Council
with respect to the assets and economic resources of Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda
and the Taliban Regime in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1390.
84. The ICJ has noted that the rule whereby self-defense warrants "only
measures which are proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond to
it" is a rule "well established in customary international law. Military and
Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 176 (June 27). The U.S.
Government has acknowledged that these rules apply to its use of force in self-
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necessity for self-defense in a punitive act of retaliation is
another matter; prevailing scholarly opinion now holds that
acts of armed reprisal are not permitted under the U.N. Charter
or customary international law,85 although this is a much
debated proposition in the context of responding to, and
deterring, terrorist attacks.86 In fact, the distinction between
reprisal and self-defense may sometimes be difficult to discern
in responding to specific acts of terror.87
It is clear, however, that legal arguments regarding necessity,
proportionality, and reprisal figured prominently in criticism
of the U.S. raid on Libya in 1986.88 In criticizing that and other
defense, as indicated in its report to the U.N. Security Council regarding its
response to the 1993 cruise missile attack on the Iraqi Intelligence Service complex
in Baghdad: "The targets struck, and the timing and method of attack used, were
carefully designed to minimize risks of collateral damage to civilians and to
comply with international law, including the rules of necessity and
proportionality." Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States of
America, to the United Nations, supra note 8.
85. See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES
281 (1963) ("The provisions of the Charter relating to the peaceful settlement of
disputes and non-resort to the use of force are universally regarded as prohibiting
reprisals which involve the use of force."); Derek Bowett, Reprisals Involving
Recourse to Armed Force, AM. J. INVL L. 1 (1972) ("Few propositions about
international law have enjoyed more support than the proposition that, under the
Charter of the United Nations, the use of force by way of reprisals is illegal."); see
also Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States, G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 72, at 122 ("States have a duty
to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force.").
86. O'Brien, supra note 18, at 469 (examining numerous uses of armed force by
states and arguing that it is "unrealistic" to deny "the element of deterrence to
self-defense"). With respect to the requirement for proportionality and the issue of
deterrence, see Beck & Arend, supra note 58, at 208 (1994) ("If proportionality
consists of a reasonable relation of means to ends, it would not be
disproportionate if in some cases the retaliatory force exceeded the original attack
to serve its deterrent aim.") (quoting Oscar Schachter, The Extra-Territorial Use of
Force against Terrorist Bases, 11 HOuS. J. INT'L L. 309, 315 (1989)).
87. Guy Roberts, Military Responses to Terrorism, 81 PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.
318, 318 (1987) (concluding that some armed reprisals cannot be properly
distinguished from legitimate acts of self-defense); see also Bowett, supra note 85,
at 3 (noting difficulties in finding the "dividing line" between protection and
retribution).
88. Objections were raised with respect to the necessity and proportionality of
the U.S. raid during U.N. Security Council deliberations. For example, although
Denmark voted against a proposed U.N. Security Council resolution condemning
the United States for the raid, the Denmark representative to the Security Council
nonetheless questioned the proportionality of the U.S. attack and "deeply
deplored" it. See Surchin, supra note 61, at 485 (citing U.N. SCOR, 41st Sess., 2682d
mtg. at 32, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2682 (1986)); Wallace F. Warriner, The Unilateral Use of
Coercion Under International Law: A Legal Analysis of the United States Raid on Libya
on April 14, 1986, 37 NAVAL L. REV. 49, 89 (1998) ("Mr. Bhagat, the delegate from
India and also representing the 101-member Movement of Nonaligned Countries"
stressed that "'[n]othing can justify the use of massive force or an armed attack
against a sovereign State, in contravention of the purposes and principles of the
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uses of force, some commentators have argued that the
doctrine of necessity in self-defense requires "immediacy", i.e.,
an imminent threat requiring an immediate or close-in-time
response.8 9 In this regard, some writers are fond of citing
Secretary of State Daniel Webster and his statement to Lord
Ashburton, a special British representative to Washington, in
the Caroline dispute that a state must demonstrate a "necessity
for self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of
means, and no moment for deliberation" and must do "nothing
unreasonable or excessive, since the act, justified by the
necessity of self-defense must be kept dearly within it."90
Webster's comments in the Caroline dispute were, however,
related to the standards applicable to a state launching a
preemptive strike or engaging in a form of anticipatory self-
defense91 and cannot be relied on to establish a rule prohibiting
United Nations Charter."') (citing U.N. SCOR, 41st Sess., 2683d mtg. at 12, U.N.
Doc. S/PV.2683 (1986)). Although the U.S. Government had argued that the Berlin
disco bombing was part of a continuing campaign of terror, some writers
criticized the scale of the American response to limited number of deaths and
injuries in the Berlin disco bombing. See Rowles, supra note 54, at 313 ("If 10,000
such attacks were actually being launched, or a continuing campaign of such
large-scale attacks was in progress, the United States might have had a colorable
argument for bombing the terrorists' bases in Libya.").
89. See Boyle, supra note 18, at 294 (1987) ("[T]his provision of the Charter
[Article 51] made it quite clear that self-defense could only be exercised in the
event of an actual or perhaps at least imminent 'armed attack' against the state
itself. By definition, this would not include military retaliation and reprisal since
they occur after the fact."); Mark Baker, Terrorism and the Inherent Right of Self-
defense (A Call to Amend the United Nations Charter), 10 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 25, 34 (1987)
(arguing that the "temporal element of the requirement of necessity means that a
response must be made close in time to the actual attack.").
90. James Bassett Moore, Destruction of the "Caroline, " 2 DIG. OF INT'L L. 409,412
(1906). In related correspondence, Webster also argued that the British were
required to first exhaust peaceful approaches to resolving the dispute by calling
on the British to show that "admonition or remonstrance to the persons on board
the Caroline was impracticable or would have been unavailing." Letter from Mr.
Webster to Mr. Fox (April 24, 1841), reprinted in 29 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE
PAPERS 1129,1138 (1857).
91. See BOWE-IT, supra note 27, at 188-189; Martin A. Rogoff & Edward Collins,
Jr., The Caroline Incident and the Development of International Law, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 493, 500 (1990); see also Wedgwood, supra note 55, at 565 (referring to the
demanding Caroline test as the "classical statement of anticipatory self-defense.").
The Caroline standard was applied by the Nuremburg Tribunal in rejecting the
defendants arguments that Germany's invasion of Norway in 1940 was necessary
to prevent the Allies from occupying Norway. Webster's formulation was thus
cited by the Tribunal as the standard for a "preventative" action in foreign
territory. See Robert F. Teplitz, Note, Taking Assassination Attempts Seriously: Did the
United States Violate International Law in Forcefully Responding to the Iraqi Plot to Kill
George Bush?, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 569,578-579 (citing the Office of the U.S. Chief
Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression:
Opinion and Judgement 36 (1947)).
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a state from responding with force to repulse and end on-going
acts of aggression after that state has been the target of
repeated attacks and faces a near certainty that more attacks
will follow. In fact, an unnecessarily strict or overly broad
reading of the necessity requirement could prohibit almost all
"after the fact" acts of self-defense except those that are
immediately necessary to repel an attack or prevent being
overwhelmed. Such a strict and self-defeating version of
necessity expansively based on the Caroline test does not
appear to be consistent with the right of self-defense under
customary international law and has been vigorously opposed
by a number of writers, particularly in the context of fighting
92terrorism. Similarly, an overly broad or strict reading of
proportionality, which would require a state's armed response
in self-defense to be in exact proportion to the attack suffered,
is not consistent with customary international law, particularly
in relation to attacks received during an on-going conflict.93
The use of force by the United States in response to the
9Z See Alberto Coll, The Legal and Moral Adequacy of Military Responses to
Terrorism, 81 PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 297, 302 (1987) (rejecting the Caroline
necessity standard for modem terrorist threats); Sofaer, supra note 55, at 97
(arguing that the Caroline test "exaggerates the test of necessity in a situation
where that issue was dicta" and when "war was still a permissible option for
states that had actually been attacked"); O'Brien, supra note 18, at 471 (arguing
that with the advent of terrorism, particularly in the context of Israel's war with
the PLO, the "interpretation of necessity is very different from that in a singular
incident along the U.S.-Canadian border in 1837").
93. Some writers, particularly in criticizing the U.S. raid on Libya in 1986,
argued that the right of self-defense "is limited by the requirement that the force
used must be proportionate to the threat and cannot exceed measures strictly
necessary to repel a threat." Gregory F. Intoccia, American Bombing of Libya: An
International Legal Analysis, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 177, 205-206 (1987)
(emphasis added). The ICJ applied a strict standard of necessity in the Nicaragua
case, concluding that U.S. actions against Nicaragua in defense of El Salvador
were not based on necessity since those actions were taken several months after
the major armed offensive by the rebels in El Salvador had been repulsed. Military
and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 109 (June 27). In
criticizing unrealistically strict views of the requirements of necessity and
proportionality, State Department Legal Advisor Abraham D. Sofaer argued that
respect for such requirements is undermined when states "are expected to accept
too high a degree of risk of substantial injury before being allowed to defend
themselves or to accept a continuation of unlawful aggression because of a tit-for-
tat on military response. The law should not be construed to prevent military
planners from implementing measures they reasonably consider necessary to
prevent unlawful attacks." Abraham D. Sofaer, supra note 55, at 97-98. In this
regard, Judge Sofaer noted the comments of Judge Schwebel in his dissent in the
Nicaragua case to the effect that "an action is proportional when it is necessary to
end and to repulse an attack, not just when it corresponds exactly to acts of
aggression." Id. at 97 (citation omitted).
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September 11 terrorist attacks seems, however, to involve facts
which make the exercise of the inherent right of self-defense
under the U.N. Charter less vulnerable to the criticism that U.S.
actions are not necessary and proportionate or that they
constitute prohibited acts of retaliation, revenge, or reprisal. As
noted above, these horrific terrorist acts, which were
immediately condemned by the international community, were
not minor terrorist incidents; in fact, the magnitude of the
September 11 terrorist attacks on the territory of the United
States far exceeds the damage of any previous terrorist attack in
world history. The deaths of thousands of persons from eighty-
six different countries, untold additional personal injuries, and
the enormous property and economic damage associated with
the September 11 terrorist attacks have prompted many
commentators to compare the attacks not with previous
incidents of terrorism but with acts of aggression such as the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.'
Nor were the September 11 terrorist attacks isolated acts.
Rather, they were part of an on-going terrorist campaign over
many years that has been directed by the Al Qaeda terrorist
network against the United States,95 and it is a campaign which
94. David E. Rosenbaum, A Day of Terror: The Warnings; Years of Unheeded
Alarms, N.Y. TIMES, Sept 12, 2001, at A25 (quoting former Senator Warren
Rudman, former Co-Chairman of the U.S. Commission on National Security, who
called the attacks "'another Pearl Harbor'); see also Michael R. Gordon, After the
Attacks: An Assessment; U.S. Force v. Terrorists: From Reactive to Active, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 14, 2001 at A16. While the final number of victims for all three of the
September 11 terrorist attacks was revised to 3,245 persons killed, that figure
would still be higher than the 2,400 Americans killed at Pearl Harbor. See Eric
Lipton, A Nation Challenged: The Toll; Toll From Attack at Trade Center is Down
Sharply, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2001, at Al. According to Attorney General John
Ashcroft, citizens of 86 nations were killed in the September 11 terrorist attacks.
Linda Wertheimer, All Things Considered (National Public Radio broadcast, Dec.
14, 2001). In addition to the terrible loss of life, estimates of economic damage
related to the September 11 attacks has been calculated at over 100 billion
dollars-with costs still mounting-and a loss of more than 100,000 jobs, with
some economists "predicting a final figure of 500,000." David Williams, US Counts
Economic Cost of Terror-Driven Devastation, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 10, 2001,
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Agence France Presse File; see also Chris Baker, Putting a
Price Tag on Terror, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2001, at Al; other studies estimate that
"[t]he Sept 11 terrorist attacks will cost the nation more than 1.8 million jobs" by
the end of 2002. Attacks May Cost U.S. 1.8 Million Jobs, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 13, 2002, at
14.
95. In a statement before the British Parliament, Prime Minister Blair noted that
Osama bin Laden has been responsible for a number of "terrorist outrages" over
the past decade, including the 1993 attack on U.S. military personnel serving in
Somalia, the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tahzania,
unsuccessful attempted bombings in Jordan and Los Angeles at the turn of the
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Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders have insisted must and will
continue until America capitulates or is destroyed. 6 Even as
the twisted remains of the World Trade Towers smoldered just
a few blocks away from a federal courthouse in New York on
October 18, 2001, one of the four men convicted of bombing
U.S. Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998 responded to
being sentenced to life in prison by "proudly describing
himself as a 'soldier in the military wing of al Qaeda."' 97 In
addition, police and intelligence organizations in numerous
states believe they have considerable evidence to support
claims of continuing planned attacks by the Al Qaeda network,
which appears to be actively engaged in continuing its "holy
war" against the United States.98
In this context, the United States and its allies seem to have
had little choice but to act forcefully in self-defense and defeat
the Al Qaeda network and its sponsor, the Taliban Regime,
particularly after having given the Taliban several
millennium, and the attack on the USS Cole in 2000 that killed 17 crew members
and injured 40 others. Prime Minister Tony Blair, Prime Minister's Statement to
Parliament (Oct. 4, 2001) (transcript available at http://www.number-10.gov.uk/
news.asp?Newsld=2683). Blair also noted that in February 1988, Osama bin Laden
had signed a fatwa stating that "the killing of Americans and their civilian and
military allies is a religious duty." Id. See also Terrorist Hits and Misses; A
Chronology of Mayhem, TIME, Nov. 12, 2001, at 68.
96. The Taliban's leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar, is quoted as saying he had
"'a grand plan to destroy America, which will begin shortly."' Nora Boustany,
Arab Newspapers Focus on Taliban 's Fall, WASH. POST., Nov. 16, 2001 at A38. Omar
is also quoted as saying "'The real matter is the extinction of America and, God
willing, it will fall to the ground."' Notebook, TIME, Nov. 26, 2001, at 19. If the
world had any doubt about the likelihood of additional terrorist attacks on the
United States and its allies, the leader of the Al Qaeda terrorist network
eliminated those doubts when he took to the airwaves on October 7 and in a
videotaped interview on al-Jazeera TV news broadcast from Qatar stated: "'Here
is America struck by God Almighty... so that its greatest buildings are destroyed.
I swear to God that America will not live in peace before peace reigns in
Palestine, and before the army of infidels depart the land of Mohammed.'"
Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States, 11 Sept. 2001: Executive
Summary, 10 DOWNING STREET NEWSROOM, Nov. 14, 2001, at http://www.
number-10.gov.uk/default.asp?Paged=5321. In addition, Al Qaeda interest in
weapons of mass destruction has not reduced the apparent threat facing the
United States. See James Risen & Judith Miller, Chemical Weapons: Al Qaeda Sites
Point to Test of Chemicals, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2001, at B1.
97. Michael Powell, 4 Bombers Get Life Sentences, Bin Laden Associates Planned
1998 Embassy Blasts, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 2001, at Al.
98. Raymond Bonnen & John Tagliabue, Eavesdropping, U.S. Allies See New
Terror Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2001, at Al ("More than a month after the
September 11 terror attacks, the United States and its close allies are still
intercepting communications among Osama bin Laden's associates and are
convinced more attacks are coming, intelligence officials in several countries
say.").
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opportunities to avoid an armed response.' The Prime
Minister of the United Kingdom, Tony Blair, perhaps best
expressed this point on the day that Coalition forces began
attacking targets in Afghanistan by noting: "The world
understands that whilst, of course, there are dangers in acting,
the dangers of inaction are far, far greater."' In the face of
such serious attacks and continuing threats, international law
and the United Nations Charter cannot require a passive
defense in response.1"' In the context of a genuine armed attack,
even noted writers that argue for strict limits on the use of force
and a narrow interpretation of self-defense under Article 51
concede that in the case of a legitimate armed attack, self-
defense, while subject to limitations of necessity and
proportionality, "includes a right both to repel the armed
attack and to take the war to the aggressor State in order
effectively to terminate the attack and prevent a recurrence."0 2
XI. CONCLUSION
While some questions and criticisms have been directed at
America's previous uses of force against terrorist supporting
states,; the case for America's forcible response to the
September 11 attacks as being fully consistent with the inherent
right of self-defense under customary international law and
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter is very strong. The unanimous
condemnation of the attacks by the U.N. General Assembly and
Security Council, the affirmation of the right of self-defense by
the Security Council, the growing consensus in the
99. To the extent that customary international law and Art. 2(3) of the U.N.
Charter call for efforts to first achieve a peaceful solution to disputes before
resorting to force, the United States appears to have attempted to comply with
such requirements by offering the Taliban several opportunities to avoid an
armed response. See discussion supra note 22.
100. Prime Minister Tony Blair, Prime Minister's Statement on Military Action
in Afghanistan, 10 DOWNING STREEt NEWSROOM, Oct 9, 2001, at http://www.
number-10.gov.uk/news.asp?NewsId=2692. With respect to the ultimatum
delivered to the Taliban to yield up the terrorists or face the consequences, Blair
stated: "It is clear that they will not do this. They were given the choice of siding
with justice or siding with terror and they chose terror." Id.
101. Even when facing a more ambiguous threat in an earlier era, U.S. Secretary
of State George Schultz noted that: "A nation attacked by terrorists is permitted to
use force to prevent or preempt future attacks .... The U.N. Charter is not a
suicide pact. The law is a weapon on our side, and it is up to us to use it to its
maximum extent." George Schultz, Low Intensity Warfare: The Challenge of
Ambiguity, 86 DEFT. ST. BULL. 15,17 (March 1986).
102. LOUIS HENK14 EAL, RIGHr V. MIGHT 45 (1991).
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international community to hold states accountable for terrorist
actions, and the repeated condemnation by the Security
Council of the Taliban Regime's support of terrorists in
particular, clearly help establish an appropriate framework
under international law for the exercise of self-defense by the
United States.
In this framework, an examination of the character, nature,
location, and terrible scope of the September 11 terrorist attacks
on, the United States, their clear connection with the Al Qaeda
terrorist network, the clear connection between Al Qaeda and
the Taliban Regime, and the statements of support and acts of
assistance by an overwhelming number of states for the United
States in its response to the September 11 terrorist attacks help
demonstrate the fundamental legal soundness of America's
"new war" on terror. If self-defense is to have any meaning in
the modern era, international law should not be interpreted to
prohibit the United States from exercising its inherent right of
self-defense under Article 51 to respond with force against a
state that has so directly sheltered, sponsored, and supported
the terrorist organizations responsible for the horrific attacks of
September 11 on the United States.
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